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VARIETIES OF ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT1
HOWARD ROBINSON
Central European University, Budapest
Abstract. I  consider what I  hope are increasingly sophisticated versions of 
ontological argument, beginning from simple definitional forms, through 
three versions to be found in Anselm, with their recent interpretations by 
malcolm, Plantinga, Klima and lowe. I try to show why none of these work by 
investigating both the different senses of necessary existence and the conditions 
under which logically necessary existence can be brought to bear. Although none 
of these arguments work, I think that they lead to interesting reflections on the 
nature of definition, on the conditions for possessing the property of necessary 
existence and point towards a different, neo-Platonic ground for God’s meeting 
the criteria for being logically necessary.
1 This paper has a long history. The idea that the simpler versions of the ontological 
argument fail, not because ‘existence is not a predicate’, but because of a misunderstanding 
of the nature of definition, began life for me in a graduate paper written for basil mitchell 
in 1969. much of the rest of the paper was developed for a Jan Hus society sponsored 
‘flying university’ talk in the suburbs of Prague in 1986, chaired by Petr rezek: this was 
further modified for a  completely above board talk in budapest in 1988. This latter 
version was published in the final edition of the journal Annales in budapest in 1992. 
This fascicule was edited by Istvan bodnar, Gabor boros and Kornel steiger – three 
philosophers who have done heroic work in developing the history of philosophy in 
Hungary during the final years of communism and into the democratic era. Various 
versions of the paper have also been presented at meetings in oxford and liverpool and 
I have recently benefited from discussion with brian Davies, o.P. because I would like 
the piece to be available to a wider readership than the obscure and extinct Annales could 
make it, and because I wish to bring that article up to date, I present this revised version 
here. I am very grateful to Fordham university for allowing me to be a visiting scholar 
during the period when I was rewriting the article.
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I. INTroDuCTIoN
At least two important monographs on the ontological argument (oA) 
have appeared in the last forty years. one is Jonathan barnes’s pellucid 
(1972), the other Graham oppy’s wide ranging (1995).2 barnes was 
unfortunate because his book arrived just before Plantinga (1974) 
gave new life to the issue with his modal version of the argument.3 
oppy of course, covers this, but it seems to me that there is still room 
for an article-length opinionated survey of the various versions of the 
argument, including those more recent than oppy. I shall try to provide 
this, and, although my conclusions will be, with reservations, negative, 
I believe they will point usefully to other related issues.
II. THe elemeNTArY or ‘sCHoolboY’ VersIoN 
oF THe ArGumeNT
The oA is associated with a variety of important philosophers, the most 
important being Anselm and Descartes. both these philosophers stated the 
argument in more than one significantly different way. There is, however, 
what one may characterize as the popular version of the argument. 
This is roughly equivalent to one of the versions generally believed to 
be in Descartes and leibniz, and fundamentally similar to st. Thomas’s 
construal of Anselm. It is probably this version of the argument which is 
nearest to what the average undergraduate understands by ‘the ontological 
argument’. This version of the argument can be expressed as follows:
A (1) God is, by definition, the most perfect being conceivable.
 (2) existence is a perfection: that is to say, to be perfect one must 
 exist in reality (and not just in the understanding, or not at all).
 Therefore,
 (3) God, by definition, exists in reality.
The Kantian tradition of objections to the argument finds fault with the 
second premise on the grounds that existence, not being an  attribute 
(because ‘exists’ is not a predicate) cannot be a component in perfection. 
An older tradition of resistance to the argument, represented by st Thomas 
2 Jonathan barnes, The Ontological Argument (london: macmillan, 1972); Graham 
oppy, Ontological Arguments and Belief in God (Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press, 1995).
3 Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974).
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and Caterus, thought it an abuse of what can be achieved from the mere 
definition or content of a word or concept. st Thomas, I think, does not 
manage to do better than merely assert that the transition from meaning 
to reality cannot be made:
Yet granted that everyone understands that by this word ‘God’ is signified 
something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, 
it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word 
signifies, exists actually, but only that it exists mentally.4
Caterus, in glossing st Thomas, improves on him saying:
Though it be conceded that an entity of the highest perfection implies 
its existence by its very name, yet it does not follow that very existence is 
anything actual in the real world, but merely that the concept of existence 
is inseparably united with the concept of highest being. (my italics.)5
Nevertheless, not even Caterus’ objection makes entirely explicit what is 
wrong with the argument in the form that I have stated it. That argument 
is prima facie valid, and the suggestion is that something is wrong with 
the first premise. essentially the mistake consists in the use of the word 
‘God’ as a  referring expression in (1), for then (1) will be true only if 
‘God’ – its subject term – does refer. so (1) is true (and the argument 
possibly sound) only if ‘God’ refers – that is, only if God exists. so the 
existence of God is presupposed, not demonstrated, by the argument.6
one possible response to this objection is to restate the argument 
mentioning, not using, ‘God’: if this could be done whilst still producing 
a valid argument it may be sound.
B (1) ‘God’ means, by definition, the most perfect being conceivable.
 (2) existence is a  perfection: that is, to be perfect something 
 must exist in reality (and not just in the mind or not at all).
 Therefore,
 (3) ‘God’ means, by definition, the being that is the most perfect 
 being conceivable and which, therefore, exists in reality.
 Therefore,
 (4) by definition the being called ‘God’ which is the most perfect 
 being conceivable, exists in reality.
4 Summa Theologica, 1a qu.2 ad.1. Also quoted in Alvin Plantinga (ed.) The Ontological 
Argument (london: macmillan, 1968), p. 29.
5 Quoted in Plantinga (1968), p. 37.
6 see barnes, The Ontological Argument, pp. 67ff.
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This is, in a way, an extremely difficult argument to refute directly. A first 
thought might be that (1) is not of a  proper form for a  definition for 
certain inverted commas are missing and that it ought to read:
 (1’) ‘God’ means, by definition, ‘the most perfect being 
 conceivable’.
 (3) would then become
 (3’) ‘God’ means, by definition ‘the being that is the most 
 perfect conceivable and which exists in reality’.
From (3’) one could not move to the referring use of ‘the’ in “the being 
called ‘God’” which is necessary for (4), for reference is made in (3’) 
only to expressions. This objection is on the right lines, but is not quite 
right because one is not obliged, when giving a definition, to place both 
definiens and definiendum in inverted commas; in the definiens one is 
not referring only to an expression. It is perfectly proper, for example, to 
say that “’Table’ means (or ‘signifies’), by definition, a raised surface able 
to sustain the weight of household objects”. Nor is this possible in the 
case of ‘table’ only because it is a common noun which can have many 
instances. It is possible to do the same for a  definite description: for 
example: “The expression ‘the Queen of england’ means (or ‘signifies’) 
the female sovereign or consort of england”.
It was because of the difficulty of producing a knock-down objection 
to this sort of argument that its opponents resorted to the indirect 
method of reductio ad absurdum. This is the point of Gaunilo’s ‘perfect 
island’ and Caterus’s ‘existent lion’, both of which have existence built 
into their definition and so must, if the corresponding version of the 
ontological argument is sound, exist by definition. The rationale of this 
strategy is that if the argument is sound then one can manufacture any 
concept which includes existence and thereby prove that that sort of 
thing exists, which is absurd.
This does not, however, tell us what is wrong with the argument. The 
error could lie in deeming existence to be a perfection or a predicate, as 
Kant claimed, but the nature of the above considerations points to its 
lying in a misconception about the nature of definition.
What exactly is this misconception?
The reason why it is not possible to show that something exists simply 
by exhibiting its definition is that definitions are conditionals. The 
definition of ‘table’ given above could be rewritten as:
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Necessarily, something is a  table if and only if it possesses a raised 
surface able to sustain the weight of household objects.
For any given element in the definition the conditional is explicit:
Necessarily, if something is a table then it has a raised surface.
Applying these forms to the definition of ‘God’, we have:
Necessarily, something is God if and only if it is the most perfect 
being conceivable
and
Necessarily if something is God then it exists.
This latter proposition is interesting for its banality. once the conditional 
nature of definitions is grasped, the argument comes out as follows:
C  (1) Necessarily, if there is something which is God, then it is the 
 most perfect being conceivable.
 (2) existence is a  perfection: that is, to be perfect something 
 must exist in reality (and not just in the mind, or not at all).
 Therefore,
 (3) Necessarily, if there is something which is god, then it exists 
 in reality.
one could substitute any noun F for ‘God’ in (3) and the sentence would 
remain true, unless the F in question was of a mythical or fictional entity. 
except in these latter cases, existing is a necessary condition for being 
anything and hence can harmlessly be included in the definition of 
anything – indeed it goes without saying that existence enters into the 
definition of any F, if definition involves giving necessary and sufficient 
conditions for being F: something could not be an F without existing.
These last remarks are not meant to be a  weighty contribution to the 
question of whether ‘exists’ is a predicate. rather the point is that even 
if we follow the superficial grammatical facts and treat it as a predicate, 
it enters harmlessly into definitions, once the conditional nature of 
definition is perceived. The most easily intelligible fault in the popular 
version of the ontological argument has nothing to do with whether 
‘exists’ is a logical predicate.
III. DesCArTes’s ArGumeNT From ‘esseNCe’, NoT DeFINITIoN
The popular version of the argument is not, however, the only one. 
Indeed, the view that the argument rests on the definition of the word 
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‘God’ is confined almost exclusively to its opponents. Descartes insisted, 
against Caterus, that his argument rested, not on the definition of the word 
‘God’ but on the ‘immutable nature’ or ‘essence’ of God. He argues as follows:
D  (1) Anything belonging to the true immutable nature, essence or 
 form of a thing can be truly affirmed of it.
 (2) To exist belongs to God’s immutable nature.
 Therefore,
 (3) existence can be truly affirmed of God – i.e. God exists.
The soundness of this argument depends on what the expressions 
‘immutable nature’, ‘essence’, etc. are taken as referring to. If God’s 
‘immutable nature’ is a facet or feature of God Himself, then reference to 
it is possible only if God exists, and the argument is no better than the first 
version that we considered. If, on the other hand, the ‘immutable nature’ 
or ‘essence’ is some sort of abstract object, the existence of which does 
not depend directly on God’s existence, then it appears to be no different 
from the concept of God. To learn that the concept of God includes 
existence is no more interesting than discovering that the definition of 
‘God’ includes existence: like the latter, it means only that for something 
to be God it must exist. If it does not mean this harmless conditional, 
Descartes would be saying that when he thinks of the concept of God 
he can see that this concept must of its very nature be instantiated. but 
interpretation of the argument in this way empties it of its argumentative 
force. The purpose of the ontological argument is to make clear why 
this concept must be instantiated: the arguments from definition at least 
made this clear; it is, they say, because existence is part of the definition 
of the concept. Just to say that this concept must be instantiated without 
explanation is not an argument: to say that it must be instantiated because 
existence to part of the concept is to fall back on to the conditional form: 
if something is to instantiate the concept ‘God’ then it must exist.
IV. PROSLOGION II
It seems that refutation of the Cartesian forms of the argument is 
independent of whether ‘existence is a predicate’.
The same seems to be the case for at least the first of the three Anselmian 
forms of the argument. In Proslogion II, Anselm says the following:
And so lord ... we believe that thou art a being than which nothing greater 
can be conceived ... even the fool is convinced that something exists in the 
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understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, 
when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, 
exists in the understanding. And assuredly, that, than which nothing 
greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, 
suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to 
exist in reality; which is greater. Therefore, if that, than which nothing 
greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very 
being, than which nothing greater can be conceived is one, than which 
a greater can be conceived. but obviously this is impossible. Hence, there 
is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be 
conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.7
At first sight one might be tempted to treat this argument as essentially 
similar to the popular version with which we began. It would then run 
as follows:
E (1) God is greater than anything else conceivable.
 (2) It is greater to exist in reality than in the understanding alone.
 Therefore,
 (3) God exists in reality, not in the understanding alone.
This argument differs only in trivial verbal ways from the original 
popular version of the argument that we considered initially; ‘God’ is 
being used as a referring expression and hence the question is begged. 
but this does not do full justice to the oddity of Anselm’s argument. It can 
be restated in a way which mentions rather than uses ‘God’ and which 
accommodates the conditionality of definition, yet which leads validly to 
the desired conclusion.
F (1) If anything is God then it is greater than anything else 
 conceivable.
 (2) God exists in the understanding.
 Therefore,
 (3) God exists – that is, something is God. ((2), a fortiori)
 Therefore,
 (4) God is greater than anything else conceivable. ((1), (3) mP)
 (5) It is greater to exist in reality than in the understanding alone.
7 This is an abridgment of chapter 2 of the Proslogion. It is in Plantinga (1968), pp. 3-4. 
An  easily available edition of Anselm alone is St Anselm: Basic Writings, translated s. N. 
Deane, with an introduction by Charles Hartshorne (la salle, Il: open court, 1962), pp. 53-4.
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 Therefore,
 (6) God exists in reality, not in the understanding alone.
The trick is worked in the full version of the argument by deeming God’s 
existence in the understanding to be a real mode of His existing. This 
enables us to overcome the conditionality of the definition in (1). The 
line of argument in (1) to (3) is not explicit in Anselm’s text, but it’s 
conclusion is essential to his argument. The reductio conclusion that, if 
God existed only in the mind then He would both be and not be the 
greatest being conceivable follows only if what is in the mind is God. 
There is no contradiction if what is in the mind is simply the idea of 
God, for there is no reason to say that that is the greatest being – it is 
just the idea of the greatest being. Although this view of existence in the 
understanding is plainly in Anselm’s text, it is also plainly false. even 
contemporaries pointed out to Anselm that ‘x exists in s’s understanding’ 
was merely a way of saying ‘s has an idea of x’. Is there any way of making 
Anselm’s move less of a simple howler?
The move from (2) to (3) can, however, be made less bizarre than it 
seems at first sight if one imputes to him a certain theory of concepts. 
Concepts are somewhat mysterious entities and it would not be entirely 
alien to the classical approach to thought to say that the concept of x is 
literally to be explained as the existence-in-the-mind of x itself. such 
a theory could be compared to the realist theory-of-appearing approach 
to perception. According to the latter, when I see an object looking red 
that object is appearing redly to me: that is, the object itself confronts my 
sense under a particular mode of appearing. similarly, in thought objects 
take on, not a sensory form, but an intellectual one – an esse intentionale – 
and so constitute the content of those mental acts which concern them.
There are two grounds for doubting whether Anselm could have 
held such a  theory. First, it may be anachronistic to ascribe such 
an Aristotelian-seeming theory to Anselm. second, it involves allowing 
that a particular object enters the intellect, whereas the intellect deals only 
with forms. This modification might, however, help our understanding 
of the argument, and the manner of its rejection by Gaunilo and st 
Thomas. In the case of normal objects, it is their form which enters the 
intellect where it is ‘thought universally’ - that is, deprived of the matter 
which creates its individuality in the object itself. such objects, therefore, 
do not really exist in the intellect, but only their forms. but for God the 
case, it could be argued, is different. God’s essence – His form – and 
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His existence are identical, according to mediaeval thought. Therefore, 
if God enters our thoughts in the same way as other objects, by His 
form entering the intellect, His existence would thereby also become the 
direct object of the intellect, and the very being of God would be grasped 
by the mind in a way comparable to that in which one might hold that 
an abstract object (e.g. a universal) is directly apprehended, leaving no 
gap between the mental object and the thing itself. That such a theory of 
thought is relevant to the argument is suggested by Aquinas’ otherwise 
puzzling development of his objections. He says that a proposition can 
be self-evident in either of two ways: either in itself, or in itself and to us.
A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways; on the one hand, self-
evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and 
to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in 
the essence of the subject, as ‘man is an animal’ for animal is contained 
in the essence of man. If, therefore, the essence of the predicate and 
subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as 
is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms 
of which are common things that no-one is ignorant of, such as being 
and non-being, whole and part, and suchlike. If, however, there are 
some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, 
the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do 
not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. 
... Therefore, I  say that this proposition, ‘God exists’, of itself is self-
evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject; because God is His 
own existence as will be hereafter shown (1aQ. III, a. 4). Now because we 
do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to 
us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, 
though less known in their nature - namely, by effects.8
In this passage Aquinas concedes that if we knew enough of God’s nature 
then we would see that ‘God exists’ expresses an analytic truth, because 
He – or His essence – is not distinct from His existence. This prompts 
the reply that we do, if we have read and believed Summa Theologica 
1a.Q.III, A.4, know that God’s existence is identical with His essence, 
and we know, therefore, that the predicate of ‘God exists’ is contained in 
the subject and hence that the ontological argument is sound. but this 
objection to Aquinas misses the point. Although we may be convinced 
that the proposition that ‘God’s essence is identical with His existence’ 
8 Summa Theologica, 1a qu.2 ad.3. Quoted in Plantinga (1968), pp. 29-30.
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is true, we can never apprehend its truth simply by contemplating its 
subject and predicate, as we can with ‘man is an animal’ or ‘four is twice 
two’, because the form of its subject is beyond our intellectual grasp. We 
are obliged, therefore, to approach its truth indirectly. The words can 
never convey directly to us the full reality of the truth they express, and 
there is no contradiction of what is directly before our minds in doubting 
its truth and hence in doubting the truth of ‘God exists’.
The Thomist position can be expressed as follows. Philosophy can show 
that the concept of a being whose existence is identical with its essence is 
a coherent one and it can bring a posteriori arguments to show that there 
is such a  being; but the human intellect is incapable of apprehending 
a priori that there is such a being because it cannot think the divine form, 
which would be required to apprehend a priori its inseparability from 
existence. Anselm’s error is to think that an understanding of the words 
is equivalent to grasping the forms that lie behind them, and hence of 
thinking that the Divine Form, which is inseparable from the Divine 
existence, exists in his own mind.
V. AN AlTerNATIVe sTrATeGY For mAKING reFereNCe To 
GoD NoN-QuesTIoN-beGGING?
It might seem that Gyula Klima9 has a strategy for circumventing most 
of my arguments in section 1-4 above. He maintains (rightly in my view) 
that reference is an intentional idiom and so one can refer to something 
and attribute it properties without committing oneself to its existence. 
one can talk about, and hence refer to, the Abominable snowman, 
the Fountain of Youth, or God, irrespective of whether they exist. so 
the referential use of ‘God’ in ‘God is the greatest being conceivable’ 
is legitimate and neither requires rewriting in conditional form (‘if 
something is God then it is the greatest being conceivable’) nor does 
it assume His existence; as the idiom is intentional, you can then say 
God is the greatest being conceivable referentially without begging the 
question of His existence. This is, I believe, unobjectionable so far. The 
question is whether this legitimizes Anselm’s argument. Klima believes 
that it does and argues as follows, using ‘thought object’ as his term for 
an intentional object
9 Gyula Klima, ‘st Anselm’s Proof: a Problem of reference, Intentional Identity and 
mutual understanding’, in Medieval Philosophy and Modern Times, ed. G. Hintikka 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000), pp. 69-88.
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by the meaning of the term,
G  (1) God is the thought object than which no thought object can 
 be thought to be greater.
 Now suppose that
 (2) God is only in the intellect (i.e. God is thought of, but does 
 not exist).
 but certainly
 (3) any thought object that can be thought to exist in reality can 
 be thought to be greater than any thought object that is only in 
 the intellect.
 And it cannot be doubted that
 (4) God can be thought to exist in reality.
 Therefore,
 (5) some thought object can be thought to be greater than the 
 thought object than which no thought object can be thought to 
 be greater [1,2,3,4]
 which is a  contradiction, whence we have to abandon our 
 supposition that God is only in the intellect, so he has to exist in 
 reality, too.
(3) is the crucial line. It says, in effect, that God qua intentional object, 
or intentionally inexistent, would not be the greatest being conceivable, 
as any real being one thought of would be greater. but this employment 
of intentional reference is surely an abuse. (3) cannot be correct because 
most thought objects that exist only in the intellect can be and often 
are thought to exist in reality, but they are not thereby rendered greater 
than themselves. For example, maybe the Abominable snowman exists 
only in the intellect, but can be (because it is) thought to exist in reality 
by those who believe in it. In fact anything not explicitly contradictory, 
fictional or mythological can be thought to exist in reality, whether it 
does or not. so God, even if He does not exist, is thought of as existing in 
reality. so there is not the required contrast between existing only in the 
intellect and being thought of as existing in reality.
I believe Klima is confusing (3) with
(3’) any thought object that can be thought to exist in reality can be 
thought to be greater than any thought object that is thought of as only 
in the intellect.
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(3’) applies to the explicitly contradictory, fictional or mythological.
An entity qua intentional never possesses its normal properties actually. 
The Abominable snowman, qua intentionally inexistent, does not make 
large footprints or stride through the forest: only the actual creature does 
these things, if it actually exists. similarly for all its natural properties 
and similarly for the divine perfections: God, if He exists, is greater than 
anything else could conceivably be. You cannot attribute an  object’s 
defining properties to it qua intentional object, except in the conditional 
sense that they tell you what would have to be the case if the object were 
actual. The deployment of the intentionality of reference does not aid 
the argument and the same problems arise. None of ‘God in the mind’, 
the idea of God, or God qua intentional object are in the competition, as 
winners or losers, for maximal greatness.
VI. PROSLOGION III
It is Anselm’s second argument, in Proslogion III, which brings us nearest 
to the question of the connexion between existence and predication.
For, it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to 
exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence, 
if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not 
to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater can be conceived. but 
this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is, then, so truly a being than 
which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be 
conceived not to exist; and this being thou art, o lord, our God.
modern commentators have argued that this argument is different 
from that in Proslogion II because it attributes by definition to God the 
property of necessary existence, rather than the property of existence. 
The distinction is between necessarily possessing the property of 
existing and possessing the property of necessarily existing: and the 
suggestion is that God necessarily possesses the property of existing 
because He possesses the property of necessarily existing. The property 
of necessarily existing is represented by the idea that His non-existence is 
inconceivable. No-one, I think, believes that Anselm was explicitly aware 
of employing this distinction.
From the text quoted it is easy to construct the following argument.
H  (1) God is by definition the greatest being conceivable.
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 (2) A being is greater if its non-existence is inconceivable than if 
 its non-existence is conceivable.
 Therefore,
 (3) If God’s non-existence is conceivable then He would be less 
 great than if His non-existence were inconceivable. (Instantiation 
 of (2).)
 (4) If God’s non-existence were conceivable then He would not 
 be the greatest being conceivable.
 (5) If God’s non-existence were conceivable a  contradiction 
 would follow, namely, He both would and would not be the 
 greatest being conceivable.
 Therefore,
 (6) God’s non-existence is inconceivable.
The first thing that strikes one about this argument is that (1) is cast in 
the same style as the original argument, using rather than mentioning 
‘god’ in the statement of a definition. I shall correct this soon. Next, and 
slightly less obvious, is that fact that (4) follows from (3) only with the 
assistance of a further premise.
(3a) It is conceivable that God’s non-existence be inconceivable.
This is the vital assumption that logically necessary existence is the sort of 
property that can intelligibly be attributed to God. restating the argument 
with allowance for the conditionality of definition we now have:
I (1) If something is God then it is the greatest being conceivable. 
 (2) something is greater if its non-existence is inconceivable 
 than if its non-existence is conceivable.
 Therefore,
 (3) If something is God, then it is greater if its non-existence is 
 inconceivable:
 (3a) It is possible that God’s non-existence be inconceivable.
 Therefore,
 (4) If something is God and its non-existence is conceivable 
 then it is not the greatest being conceivable.
 Therefore,
54 HoWArD robINsoN
 (5) If something is God and its non-existence is conceivable, 
 then a  contradiction follows, namely that it would and would 
 not be the greatest being conceivable.
 Therefore,
 (6) If something is God, then its non-existence is inconceivable.
 Therefore,
 (7) God’s non-existence is inconceivable.
This argument is useless unless we can detach the consequent of (6), and, 
as the antecedent asserts what we are finally trying to prove, it might 
seem unlikely that we shall be able to do so. It appears, therefore, that this 
version of the argument, like the most elementary ones, is refuted by the 
conditionality of definition. The problem is illusory, however. The notion 
that the non-existence of something is inconceivable is equivalent to the 
claim that its existence is necessary. (6) is in fact of the form
If p then necessarily p.
but it is an uncontroversial principle of modal logic that no necessary 
proposition can depend on a contingent proposition, but is self-standing. 
so from
if p then necessarily p one can conclude
necessarily p.
so (6) is equivalent to
(6’) If something is God then it [i.e. God] exists necessarily.
And from (6’) we can conclude the equivalent of (7)
(7’) God exists necessarily.
To make I valid we have had to augment Anselm’s original two premises 
((1) and (2) above) with (3a) which is a modal premise. If God’s non-
existence is inconceivable, it follows, in the way we have just seen, that 
His existence is necessary. such an idea includes, of course, the claim that 
His existence is possible. Putting this into modern jargon, we have the 
claim that God exists in some possible world and that if He exists in some 
possible world then there is a possible world in which he exists necessarily. 
It is by putting together these two ideas that the modern version of the 
argument, as I shall reconstruct it, can be built.10 We can begin with:
10 The principle modern statement, which corresponds most closely to argument J and 
K, is in Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, pp. 214-16.
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J (1) If it is logically possible that one object should possess 
 necessary existence and the other divine attributes (moral 
 perfection, omnipotence, etc.) then there is a possible world in 
 which there is an object which possesses those features together.
 (2) It is logically possible that one object should possess necessary 
 existence and the other divine attributes.
 Therefore,
 (3) There is a  possible world in which there is a  being which 
 possesses both necessary existence and the other divine 
 attributes.
 (4) ‘Necessary existence’ means existence in every possible 
 world.
 Therefore,
 (5) The being which possesses necessary existence and the other 
 divine attributes in some possible world exists in this, the actual, 
 world.
This argument would not, even if sound, constitute a proof of the existence 
of an All-Perfect God in this world. It guarantees only that a being which 
is perfect in some possible world exists – perhaps in a  much inferior 
form – in this one. To avoid this weakened conclusion one requires that 
the being possess not merely necessary existence and perfection in some 
world, but necessary existence and perfection in every world in which it 
exists: it cannot exist in an imperfect form. The argument is now altered 
to read as follows.
K (1) If it is logically possible that one object should possess both 
 necessary existence, and the property of being otherwise perfect 
 (omniscient, omnipotent, etc.) in every world in which it exists, 
 then there is a possible world in which there is an object which 
 possesses these features together.
 (2) It is logically possible that one being should possess both 
 necessary existence and the property of being otherwise perfect 
 in every world in which it exists.
 Therefore
 (3) There is a  possible world in which there is a  being which 
 possesses both necessary existence and the property of being 
 otherwise perfect in every possible world in which it exists.
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 (4) ‘Necessary existence’ (in the sense of the inconceivability of 
 non-existence) means existence in every possible world.
 Therefore,
 (5) The being which possesses both necessary existence and the 
 property of being perfect whenever it exists, exists and is perfect, 
 in the actual world.
Argument K contains two ‘transworld’ notions – that is, notions that 
tell one not just what something is, but what it must be. The weaker 
transworld notion is that God never exists in an  imperfect form: the 
stronger is the property of existing in all possible worlds. Together these 
are equivalent to (3a) in G and H, which asserts that God – the invariably 
necessary perfect being – cannot be conceived to be non-existent – i.e. 
that there is no possible world in which He does not exist.
It is at this point in the discussion, when we are to consider whether 
necessary existence is a real property, that we are nearest to the Kant-
inspired discussion of existence and predication. We have managed to 
reject all the versions of the ontological argument from A to I without 
raising the question of whether ‘exists’ is a predicate, for the faults in 
the argument concerned other matters. In particular, in the classic 
statement of the argument in A, the fault lay with the concept of 
definition employed in (1) whereas Kant’s attack concerned the use 
of ‘exists’ in (2) but before discussing the status of necessary existence 
I  shall consider a  final and rather different version of the argument 
which Anselm employs in his reply to Gaunilo. This too will throw light 
on the interpretation of J and K.
VII. ANselm’s THIrD ArGumeNT AND TWo CoNCePTs oF NeCessITY
Anselm presents a  third argument in the first chapter of his reply to 
Gaunilo. He argues:
that than which a greater is inconceivable cannot be conceived except 
as without a  beginning. but whatever can be conceived to exist, and 
does not exist, can be conceived to exist through a  beginning. Hence 
what can be conceived to exist, but does not exist, is not the being than 
which a greater cannot be conceived. Therefore, if such a being can be 
conceived to exist, necessarily it does exist.11
11 Quoted in Plantinga (1968), p. 14.
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This is most simply put into a valid form as follows:
L (1) God – that than which a greater is inconceivable – cannot be 
 conceived except as being without a beginning.
 (2) Whatever can be conceived not to exist can be conceived to 
 exist through a beginning.
 Therefore,
 (3) God – that than which a greater is inconceivable – cannot be 
 conceived not to exist.
(2) is a modification of what Anselm actually says. He talks of ‘what can 
be conceived to exist but does not exist’. The argument can be put in 
those terms, though at greater length, but it is not necessary to do so, for 
Anselm’s opponent is not claiming that God could exist, but does not, as 
his version of the premise suggests, but that, though He does, He might 
not have existed. Nevertheless, it is instructive to cast the argument in 
Anselm’s form, as we shall see. It would then run:
M (1) God – that than which a greater is inconceivable – cannot be 
 conceived except as being without a beginning.
 (2) What can be conceived to exist, but does not exist, can be 
 conceived to exist through a beginning.
 Therefore,
 (3) God – that than which a greater is inconceivable – cannot be 
 conceived to exist but not exist.
 Therefore,
 (4) If He can be conceived to exist then He does exist.
The interest of this version of the argument is that it anticipates leibniz’s 
modification of Descartes, that God exists if His existence is possible. This 
is not quite Anselm’s way of expressing the point: he does not consider 
possibility, but being conceived, and he thinks it sufficient for this that 
the notion be understood in a fairly superficial sense. but the conclusion 
of L is less satisfactory than K not merely because it is a  conditional, 
but principally because, even if the consequent of the conditional 
be detached it is weaker both than the conclusion of K and than the 
conclusion Anselm seems to think he can draw. He wishes to conclude 
that God necessarily exists – i.e. that His non-existence is inconceivable 
– but this cannot be derived from L because what is to be negated is only 
that He does not exist, not that His non-existence is conceivable.
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This is the argument which Norman malcolm thinks is sound. He 
reports it in the following terms.
... if you can conceive of a  certain thing and this thing does not exist 
then if it were to exist then its non-existence would be possible. It follows, 
I  believe, if it were to exist it would depend on other things both for 
coming into and continuing in existence, and also that it would have 
duration and not eternity. Therefore it would not be, either in reality or 
conception, an unlimited being, aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit.12
The governing idea here is that a contingent being is a dependent being. 
This is also the principle behind (2) in both L and M. The thought is that 
anything which may or may not exist can also come into existence – and, 
presumably, pass out of existence too.
The confusion that is being made here is one made by Kant and many 
twentieth century philosophers, namely the mistake of confusing two 
senses of ‘necessary being’. In one sense, a necessary being is a logically 
necessary being, that is, one of which the proposition asserting its 
existence is a necessary truth, so that it exists in all possible worlds.13 The 
other sense of ‘necessary being’ is of a being which is not contingent in 
the sense that it is not subject to the processes of generation and decay, 
and which (in the case of God, at least) does not depend for its existence 
on anything other than itself. This latter is the sense in which, according 
to Aristotle and Aquinas, God is a  necessary being. Now it is clearly 
logically contingent whether there are any beings which are not subject 
to the processes of generation and decay and which do not depend for 
their existence on anything else. These are, therefore, not the same as 
logically necessary beings. but it is equally plain that if a being free of 
the processes of generation and decay and owing its existence to nothing 
else were to exist, it could not have had a beginning in time, for there is 
no process by which it could have come to be and it could not have been 
created ex nihilo by anything else. It might be argued that it could have 
come into being, ex nihilo, without a  cause – that is, by pure chance, 
and that the only way to rule out this possibility is to make its existence 
logically necessary. It is certain that the scholastics believed that nothing 
12 Plantinga (1968), p. 145.
13 This distinction was first brought clearly to the attention of modern philosophers 
by Patterson brown, ‘st Thomas’s doctrine of necessary being’, Philosophical Review, 
vol. lXXIII (1964), pp. 76-90. reprinted in Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. 
Anthony Kenny (New York: Doubleday, 1964), pp. 157-74.
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could come to be ex nihilo except by a creative act, but one may reject 
this principle (though I doubt whether Anselm would have rejected it). 
The thought would be that to come into existence is to receive existence 
from elsewhere and therefore to breach one of the conditions for being 
the sort of necessary being that God is said to be. It might be doubted, 
however, whether a being that just pops into existence receives its being 
from anywhere. Nevertheless, such an  event could not be part of any 
naturally intelligible or explicable process and such a being could not be 
generated: the possibility of its coming randomly into existence is not 
something that belongs to it as an expression of the kind of thing that it 
is. Putting aside these problems, it is in this sense that God is said to be 
a necessary being by those who do not accept the ontological argument, 
and it is a  sense which Kant, in his accusation that the cosmological 
argument rests upon the ontological, because it is an argument for the 
existence of a  necessary being, entirely fails to grasp. (Kant, believing 
that nothing happens without a cause, could not suggest that the bare 
possibility of springing randomly into existence showed that this was 
not a  genuine sense of ‘necessary’.) In sum, the objection to Anselm’s 
third argument is that there is a conception of necessary existence, which 
one might call ‘self-subsistence’, which is weaker than logically necessary 
existence, but which is strong enough to rule out having a beginning or 
an end or an external cause.14
one recent defender of oA, e. J. lowe, does not seem to take notice 
of this distinction. He expresses the argument as follows.
N (1) God is, by definition, a maximally great being and thus a being 
 whose existence is necessary rather than merely contingent.
 (2) God, so defined, could exist; in other words he does exist in 
 some possible world.
 (3) suppose that w is a possible world in which God, so defined, 
 exists: then it is true, in w, at least, that God exists there, and, 
 being God, exists there as a necessary being.
 (4) but a necessary being is one which, by definition, exists in 
 every possible world if it exists in any possible world.
14 In Aristotle’s Metaphysics Lambda there are two classes of beings necessary in this 
sense. The ordinary heavenly bodies are not subject to natural generation or decay but 
they are not self-sufficient in that they owe their being to the prime mover, which is free 
from generation and decay and wholly self-sufficient. God would be self-sufficient in the 
strong sense. Lambda, chapter 8 (1073a14 to 1074b14).
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 (5) Hence, the God who exists as a necessary being in w is a being 
 that exists in every possible world, including this, the actual world.
 (6) Therefore, God exists in the actual world; he actually exists.15
lowe’s form ignores the conditionality of definition, but this can be 
handled as it is above. The main problem is that he, like Plantinga, 
assumes that the greatness-making property necessary existence is 
logically necessary existence, and not the Aristotelian sense of being free 
from the possibility of generation or decay.
The conflation of these two senses of ‘necessary’ is explicable in 
an  Aristotelian or medieval context because the view that anything 
possible is at some time and place actual is often ascribed to Aristotle. It 
involves equating the space of logical possibility with actual space-time. It 
is as if ‘might have happened to be the case’ is conflated with ‘might have 
happened – i.e. come about, or occurred in time’. It is certainly part of 
the orthodox conception of God that if He exists at all He exists from all 
eternity and for all eternity, so if the conceivability of His non-existence 
meant that He was the sort of thing that might come into existence, 
His non-existence would be inconceivable. but if we do not make this 
conflation, the conclusion does not follow.
The issue then seems to be this: can the concept of logically necessary 
existence be coherently applied to a non-abstract being like God, for if it 
can the argument is sound and if it cannot, it is not.16
VIII. A mIsTAKeN obJeCTIoN To THe ArGumeNT
There are, broadly, three ways of attacking oA. one is to attack the 
argument directly, by disputing the truth of a premise or the logic of the 
argument. The other is to try to show that similar forms of argument 
give rise to conclusions no-one wants to accept and so to show – or very 
15 e. J. lowe, ‘The ontological Argument’, in The Routledge Companion to the 
Philosophy of Religion, eds C. meister and P. Copan (london: routledge, 2007), pp. 331-
40. (I have changed only the numbers given to the steps.)
16 There has been considerable discussion of Gödel’s version of the argument; see 
J. sobel, Logic and Theism (New York: Cambridge university Press, 2004). As far as I can 
see, apart from more or less purely formal issues, this raises no new questions. Gödel has 
one premise which defines God as a being that possesses all and only positive properties, 
and an  axiom that says that necessary existence is a  positive property. The parallels 
between perfection or greatness, and positive properties, and between calling necessary 
existence a  great-making, or perfect-making property and calling it positive are clear 
enough. so I do not see that new substantive issues arise.
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strongly indicate – that something must be wrong with the argument. 
most of the discussion has concerned the first path. The Gaunilo and 
Caterus strategies are cases of the second. I shall argue in section 9 that 
these arguments can be countered by claiming that definitional existence 
(or necessary existence) must supervene (in an  intuitive sense of that 
quasi technical term) on the other properties of the object and cannot be 
added in an arbitrary way.
There is a third category, similar in some ways to the second, in which 
there are examples purporting to show that arguments similar to those 
that prove that maximal greatness is instantiated in some possible world 
can also be used to show that properties inconsistent with maximal 
greatness are also instantiated. Plantinga’s example17 is the property of 
no-maximality, which is the property of there not being a  maximally 
great entity. This seems to be just as coherent a  property as maximal 
greatness and so to be as good a  candidate for being instantiated in 
some possible world. but if it is, then there is no-maximally great being. 
Plantinga seems to think that one has to choose between these options, 
on the basis of faith rather than reason, so to speak.
This does not seem to me to be a strong objection. maximal greatness 
is a  purported property of first order individuals and no-maximality 
a  property of worlds. This gives priority to maximal greatness, for, in 
general, world properties depend or supervene on the properties of the 
objects in them: if maximality has its foot in the door by being a possible 
property of a first order entity, then no-maximality is excluded.
IX. THe ArGumeNT AND ‘A FooTHolD IN reAlITY’
In the original version of this paper, cited in footnote 1, I  claimed 
that there is, in fact, a surprising analogy between J and Anselm’s first 
argument, as expressed in F above. both arguments operate by treating 
as a  foothold in reality something which is not such a  foothold, and 
then arguing that if the greatest being conceivable exists in that minor 
way He must exist in a greater way. In Anselm’s case, existence in the 
mind is wrongly treated as a mode of existence for the thing thought of: 
for Plantinga, existence in a  possible world is similarly confused with 
a  genuine mode of existence. I  now think that this interpretation of 
Plantinga’s argument is mistaken.
17 Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, pp. 217-21.
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In the case of what we have called Anselm’s first argument – F above 
– the extension from the foothold in reality to full actuality is driven 
by the demands of ‘greatness’ – a  being existing in an  inferior mode 
cannot be the greatest. In Plantinga’s case, however, the move from 
possible existence to actual is driven by (logically) necessary existence 
and this works – if it works at all – whether or not you regard existence 
in a possible world as a genuine form of existence at all: something that 
exists of logical necessity exists actually, whatever account of possibility 
one wishes to provide.
It is, however, interesting to note that, if you are a lewisian realist 
about possible world, then there is a  form of oA using the ‘foothold’ 
principle, which is probably sound, given that realism, and given that the 
notion of a greatest being makes sense.
O. (1) The greatest possible being exists in some possible world (as 
 all possible beings do).
 (2) It would be greater to exist in all possible worlds than only in 
 one or some.
 Therefore,
 (3) The greatest possible being exists in all possible worlds, 
 including the actual world.
The only way that I think a lewisian might get around this argument is to 
say that, as transworld existence is only counterpart, the greatness of any 
real individual is not increased by existing in more worlds. I do not see 
why this should apply to unchanging necessary beings, however: would 
a lewisian Platonist be committed to saying that there was a counterpart 
number seven in each world, and not the same entity? I shall not pursue 
this argument here.
X. loGICAllY NeCessArY eXIsTeNCe AND HoW IT WorKs
The conclusion so far seems to be that the argument is sound if logically 
necessary existence is the sort of property that it makes sense to attribute 
to God. The moral that we can draw from Gaunilo-type objections is 
that this property can only be possessed when it is entailed by the rest of 
the nature of the object. Necessary existence (or existence by definition) 
cannot be added simply by stipulation to a list of properties, its presence 
must be rationalized by those other properties. so, for example, it is 
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plausible to hold that numbers, universals and the like are necessary 
existents because they are abstract entities. A similar principle applies to 
the Aristotelian, self-sufficiency form of necessary existence. It follows 
from the nature of the object, namely that it has no matter or parts which 
could give a mechanism for generation or decay.
Why do abstract entities strike us as plausible candidates for necessary 
existence? one reason, I think, is that, if one is persuaded to treat them 
realistically at all, it is difficult to see under what circumstances an abstract 
object, such as the number seven, for example, could fail to exist. I think 
that this points to a  more general criterion for logically necessary 
existence, namely that the things taken so to exist are presupposed by 
a world’s being intelligible: they are part of the framework for our finding 
any world intelligible – with the possible exception of the empty world, 
though I shall ignore that issue.
so the question is, does this apply to God – is His existence 
a precondition for a world’s being an intelligible place?
At this point, we need to distinguish two kinds of preconditions for 
intelligibility. one of these is preconditions for the intelligibility of the 
constitution of the world. The platonic entities come into this category. 
For example, without numbers, individuation of objects or events 
would be impossible: without properties or universals there could be no 
particular way a world is, no states of affairs. The second is explanatory 
intelligibility: the conditions for making sense of why the world should 
be, or how it can be, the way it is. It is plausible to claim, I think, that 
different forms of cosmological argument attempt to show that God is 
a precondition for the explanatory intelligibility of the worlds of various 
types. The temporal first cause argument, for example, purports to show 
that any non-empty world with a temporal dimension must have a cause 
outside itself; Aquinas’s first two ways, that any world with change 
requires an external cause; teleological arguments, that any world with 
functional features must be so explained.
so there are three notions of necessary existence in play. These are 
(i) logically grounded necessity, which is possessed by things whose 
existence is a  precondition of what one might call the descriptive 
intelligibility of the world; (ii) Aristotelian necessity or the necessity of 
self sufficiency, which is possessed by anything not subject, in principle, 
to processes of generation and decay nor dependent on other things; 
and (iii) explanatorily grounded necessity, according to which something 
must exist if the world is to make metaphysical sense. God, if He exists, 
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certainly possesses the second. Cosmological arguments, if successful, 
would show that He possesses the third in some form. but the logically 
necessary existence cannot be attributed to Him on the grounds of His 
definition, concept or essence, in the way that oA requires.
As a parting flourish, it is interesting to note that this last fact does not 
mean that God does not meet the condition I gave for being a logically 
necessary entity, namely that of being a precondition of the descriptive 
intelligibility of the world. He meets this condition if Aristotle and 
the neo-Platonists are correct in claiming that the world of logically 
necessary Platonic entities must be a Divine Intellect, not a collection of 
self-standing abstract objects, and this Divine Intellect is identical with 
God. I have defended this neo-Platonic position elsewhere,18 but it does 
not help oA, for that God has this status cannot be proved by the oA 
strategy, as an argument from ‘essence’ or ‘greatness’; the neo-Platonic 
strategy is an  argument for God’s logically necessary existence, not 
an argument from it.
18 Howard robinson, ‘benacerraf ’s Problem, Abstract objects and Intellect’, in Truth, 
Reference and Realism, eds Z. Novak and A. simonyi (budapest and New York, Central 
european university Press, 2011), pp. 235-62.
